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FOREIGN DISCOVERY AND U.S.
ANTITRUST POLICY-THE CONFLICT
RESOLVING MECHANISMS*
Donald L. Flexner**
A look back at the last thirty years of United States antitrust's
foreign "voyages of discovery" among friendly nations reveals a
picture too often resembling not so much an era of good feeling as
a thirty years war. Following hard upon Judge Hand's famous
formulation of the "effects" doctrine in Alcoa in 1946 the Antitrust
Division conducted a series of investigations in which compulsory
process was used to seek documents located in foreign nations.'
Prodded by what they viewed as U.S. antitrust authorities' impermissible overreaching, the affected countries began to enact defensive "blocking statutes." The passage by Canada's Ontario Province of the Business Records Protection Act started this trend in
1947.2 The reaction continued with the Province of Quebec quickly
enacting its own statute.3
In later years, Great Britain enacted its Shipping Contracts and
Commercial Documents Act;4 the Netherlands installed Article 39
of their Economic Competition Act, 5 and so it has gone almost to
the present. The most recent examples are the Amendments to
Canada's Atomic Energy Act 6 and Australia's Foreign Proceeding
(Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act.7 Both were passed in 1976
to prevent documents relative to the worldwide uranium market* Copyright by Matthew Bender & Company, Incorporated, and reprinted with
permission from the 1978 Fordham Corporate Law Institute.
** Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division. The following remarks were presented before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute at Fordham
Law School on November 15, 1978.
1. See e.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the
Production,Transportation,Refining and Distributionof Petroleum, 13 FRD 280
(D.D.C. 1952), and In re Grand Jury Investigationof the Shipping Industry, 186
F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
2. 1 Ont. Rev. Stat. c.44 (1960).
3. Quebec Business Concerns Act, Que. Rev. Stat. c.278 (1964).
4. Eliz. 2 c.87 (1964).
5. Act of June 28, 1956, as amended Act of July 16, 1978.
6. Atomic Energy Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, Uranium Information Security
Regulations, P.C. 1976-2368, amended by P.C. 1977-2923 as of October 13, 1977.
7. Australia: Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, 1901-1973 (supplemental volume for 1976).
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ing arrangements from falling within the grasp of our grand jury.
Interestingly, the refusal to accede to U.S. compulsory process
in foreign territories does not indicate implacable opposition to
underlying antitrust principles. While United States antitrust had
a head start, a significant number of nations have caught up with
us and today we come together frequently to discuss problems of
restrictive business practice control with our trading partners in
multilateral and bilateral contexts. There is strong international
consensus that restrictive business practices cutting across national boundaries must be governmentally controlled.
At the same time, however, there is little support today for binding supranational regulation. Thus, concerned nations have no
choice but to use their national laws to protect domestic interests
from injury by restrictive arrangements outside their boundaries.
The United States is a member, along with twenty-three other
countries, of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the OECD), which actively attempts to promote concensus on measures to be taken against restrictive business practices.
The United States has not changed its view of the appropriate
reach of our antitrust law's subject matter jurisdiction-that we
cannot do nor would we. But we have increasingly accepted our
responsibility as a member of the family of nations to modify investigative practices more appropriate to domestic situations when
we contemplate reaching across the water or over our northern
border for documents or testimony. We believe international comity requires us, in almost all cases, to consider and consult affected
foreign sovereigns before issuing compulsory process covering materials held outside the United States.
The Council of the OECD, its highest body, in 1967 and again
in 1973 promulgated Recommendations to member nations that
they notify and consult one another when undertaking an investigative or enforcement action against restrictive business practices
involving significant national interests of another member.
While the OECD Council Recommendations of 1967 and 1973
themselves provide the signatories a sufficient vehicle and framework for institution of consultations, such requests for aid may also
be made under bilateral arrangements of the sort we have negotiated with the antitrust enforcement agencies of the Federal Republic of Germany' and Canada.' Today, through our Foreign Coin8. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
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merce Section, we also maintain good working relations with relevant Japanese and British authorities, which have increasingly led
to fruitful gains in particular investigations, and we are exploring
a possible similar arrangement with Australia.
Our bilateral efforts have been strengthened by the most recent
Recommendation of the Council of the OECD, 0 promulgated this
past August. The Council noted that the present state of international law and of the member nations' restrictive business practice
laws presents difficulties for effective control of anticompetitive
actions by multinationals,
especially in assembling necessary information held outside the jurisdiction of the country applying its law, in serving process and in
enforcing decisions in relation to enterprises located abroad.
The Council accordingly recommended that its member governments consider several actions, the most important of which for
our purposes are:
to allow, subject to appropriate safeguards, including those relating
to confidentiality, the disclosure of information to the competent
authorities of Member countries by the other parties concerned
to facilitate, through conclusion of or adherence to bilateral or multilateral agreements or understandings, mutual administrative or
judicial aid in the field of restrictive business practices;
whilst vigorously enforcing their legislation on restrictive business
practices, to make use as far as possible of the OECD procedures
on co-operation . . . so as to facilitate consultation and resolution
of problems.
The Antitrust Division is attempting to hold to these principles
in seeking information abroad. In general, where we perceive no

serious threat of document destruction, we will proceed by requests for voluntary submissions, rather than by compulsory
process. Simultaneously, or in most instances even before issuing
a voluntary letter request, we will notify an affected government
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, dated June 23, 1976.
9. Joint Statement of November 3, 1969 ("Mitchell-Basford Undertaking").
10.

Recommendation of the Council Concerning Action Against Restrictive

Business Practices Affecting International Trade Including Those Involving Multinational Enterprises. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Paris, 9th August 1978 C(78) 133 (Final).
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under our OECD obligations. OECD notification may also be the
occasion for solicitation of assistance from antitrust enforcement
authorities or from government agencies in the particular country.
What all of this means is that we have stepped back from the
confrontation mode of the past. In the future, we see voluntary
cooperation as our first resort in obtaining information and evidence located abroad. The new emphasis is a frank recognition of
the past limited utility of compulsory process in these cases. It
occasionally produced some interesting subpoena enforcement litigation, but not many documents. So we now look to improvement
of our relationships with the countries with which we are already
cooperating, and to establishment of bilateral relationships with
other nations whenever the potentiality of conflict over antitrust
enforcement exists.
While we reserve the right to issue compulsory process running
to material in the control or possession of a United States incorporated entity or a United States individual resident abroad," we will
usually alert the relevant foreign state even in these situations
where we have a clear claim based on nationality.
As an example of our active pursuit of the policies urged by the
OECD Council, John Shenefield led a delegation of Antitrust Division, State Department and FTC representatives to Ottawa in the
second week of October for discussions with the Canadian foreign
office and antitrust authorities. The purpose of this meeting was
to update and improve our antitrust cooperation arrangement.
This effort was begun as a result of Premier Trudeau's interest,
expressed to President Carter early in 1977, in alleviating tensions
stemming from U.S. antitrust investigations. Thereafter, we took
the initiative and, via Vice President Mondale, the United States
made a specific proposal to Mr. Trudeau. Under that proposal,
United States antitrust authorities at the outset of an investigation
would refrain from issuance of compulsory process covering any
Canadian entity or Canadian subsidiary of a United States entity.
Instead we proposed to proceed in the first instance to seek information via request to the affected entity.
Discussions with the Canadians are well advanced and we are
dealing in some detail with questions of the triggering circumstances, the form and the timing of each government's actions to assist
investigations of the other. I am happy to report that, from the
beginnings of this exercise-in an atmosphere of some tension-we
11.

28 U.S.C. 1783 provides for such service abroad.
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have now progressed to the point where I believe a new and better
United States-Canadian antitrust cooperation pact should be concluded within six months.
On another front, we are working with the Government of Australia, exploring the possibilities of some similar mutual accommodation. Recently, we and the Australians have not had a smooth
relationship respecting antitrust policy, and we hope that at the
very least these first efforts will lead the Australians to a greater
understanding of our enforcement philosophy and our law. I expect
they will also produce a fuller comprehension by the United States
of the importance of the Australian national interest involved in
effective control over the production and marketing of their scarce
natural resources.
The Australian Attorney General, Senator Peter Durack, led a
delegation to Washington on September 5 for discussions with Attorney General Bell, John Shenefield and representatives of State,
the FTC and our own Foreign Commerce Section. The meeting had
been arranged during Attorney General Bell's visit to Australia
earlier in the year. While these negotiations were cordial, it was
plain that the Australians felt strongly about some of our recent
actions.
Certain progress was made, for it was agreed that, taking account of different philosophies, the parties would nonetheless attempt to formulate a mechanism through which the two governments might reduce future friction between our competition policy
on the one hand and their natural resources marketing policy on
the other.
Other promising signs had earlier been noted. On June 1, 1978,
the Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and
Resources, J.D. Anthony, announced new regulations for the export marketing of uranium. The following excerpt from that announcement was of great interest to us.
Action taken in accordance with the procedures I have outlined
in this statement should not give rise to any questions under the
anti-trust laws of other countries ....

[Wlhile the Government

does not wish to be taken as accepting that it is appropriate for other
countries to apply their anti-trust laws extraterritorially without
due regard to matters affecting our national interest, we urge our
producers not to resort to arrangements which would jeopardise
them under those laws.
The Australian Attorney General reported to Parliament the
aim of his American trip had been "to explore how, for the future,
the enforcement policies of the United States authorities might
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take account of the laws and policies of the Australian government
and the national interest of Australia." Attorney General Durack
reported that the consultations were friendly and constructive, and
expressed his optimism for an agreement being reached in the near
future. In response to a further question he expressed his hope for
such an agreement within six months.
We were equally pleased by the tenor of the Australia-United
States consultations and will be working very hard to make them
bear fruit.
I want to make it clear that our goal in this area is effective
discovery; we believe that effective discovery can be obtained only
where affected governments are convinced that our procedures are
fair and sensitive to their significant national interests. Thus, we
expect a process of good faith consultation and cooperation to yield
real benefits to our investigations.
Our commitment to voluntary cooperation and to conciliation
over differences is genuine, but I would be remiss not to say that
in some circumstances the use of compulsion and the vigorous
pursuit of sanctions available for disobedience to such process will
likely be appropriate. I can envision times when voluntary cooperation fails, resistance to our requests proves obstructive, the American national interest in the balance is strong, and the information
possessed is vital. I can even see situations where we would ask a
court to attach a foreign company's U.S. assets and declare them
forfeit to enforce its writ.
But again, our policy's goals as I have outlined them here are to
minimize confrontation, maximize effective consultative procedures and so to diminish our need for compulsory process.
There is a term in vogue in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
and I think it is apt here. The word is "transparency"-a proper
diplomatic term for avoidance of secret dealings. Cases where private companies raise the foreign compulsion or act of state defense
are often the same ones in which our discovery requests cause such
conflict. The common thread in these cases is usually the nonpublic nature of the foreign government's role in encouraging or
securing of agreements among private firms.
A feature of a bill recently introduced by Congressman Gore of
Tennessee would remedy this problem with a dose of transparency.
While we cannot support Congressman Gore's bill as currently
drawn, one of its ideas holds some attraction. Under that provision, any United States company which was urged, cajoled, or
ordered to take part in any anticompetitive arrangement abroad
with potentially adverse affects on United States commerce would
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be legally bound to promptly notify the United States antitrust
authorities.
There are several problems with this idea, especially the appropriate definition of reportable incidents, and, obviously, my discussion here of Congressman Gore's proposal should not be construed as a Justice Department endorsement. However, I think
that the notion of some sort of reporting onus on the United States
companies in sovereign compulsion incidents is worth some
thought. I think that it would dovetail nicely with our increased
emphasis on bilateral consultations, and is in tune with a proposal
we made in the last OECD meetings. We there sought to persuade
our trading partners to accept the notion that an action to restrict
trade, undertaken by one government and having competitive consequences in a second country should be recognized by all member
governments as legitimate cause for affected governments to seek
consultations under the 1967 and 1973 Council Recommendations.
A requirement imposed on United States entities operating
abroad to notify us of such actions would serve as an early alert to
the United States government to institute the consultation process. If it came promptly, we would have a good chance to employ
diplomatic means to prevent or to mitigate the effects of essentially private restraints of international trade initiated or sponsored by foreign governments. The resulting transparency would
also minimize subsequent discovery and enforcement conflicts by
moving more of the conflict of national policies into the diplomatic
realm. These are necessarily tentative thoughts, since there are
certain difficulties both with the concept of imposing a notification
requirement on a United States firm abroad and with the acceptability of such notification obligations to foreign sovereigns. However, all governments that wish to preserve a generally free market
regime for international trade should be interested in any measure
which the United States can undertake to help diminish frictions
over the extraterritorial aspects of our law. I think a notification
concept similar to that in Congressman Gore's bill might fit well
into a legal regime which emphasizes consultation and conciliation.
I would conclude simply by repeating that our commitment is
to a foreign commerce enforcement program grounded on cooperation in discovery with the governments of our major trading partners, bolstered by our increasingly mutual adherence to competition as the norm for international business dealings. We want to
develop this commitment into an enforcement mechanism as effective for our foreign commerce cases as is compulsory process for our
purely domestic cases.

